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Abstract of M.Litt. dissertation "Explaining Action"
by Zinaida Lewczuk
Our thesis concerns the explanation of human action.
According to the view we call methodological monism, to
explain an action is to appeal to some causal lav;. This
means that the explanation of action is similar to the mode
of explanation characteristic of the physical sciences.
The methodological monist can adopt two different
policies. He can try to translate intentional (mental)
language into physical language in the description and expl¬
anation of action. In Ch. I we try to show that intentional
language is indispensable, and when we try to reduce it to
extensional language we have to face the problem of indeterm¬
inacy of translation because of the holism of mental terms,
and different truth-conditions for intentional propositions.
The second possible policy for the methodological monist is
to attempt to identify mental states with brain states; in
Gh. II we show this to be unsatisfactory since the identif¬
ication cannot be established on empirical grounds alone, but
presupposes some unjustified philosophical assumptions. The
proponents of an identity theory need to give a clear account
of what is involved in the identity of events and states.
In Ch. Ill we try to disprove the suggestion that reasons
are causes of action. Knowledge of one's own future action and
the reasons for it is non-inferential, whereas our knowledge of
causes is based on inductive evidence. There is a conceptual
connection between reasons and actions, so it cannot be a causal
connection. In Ch. IV we suggest that to account for an action
we use practical reasoning, i.e. the practical syllogism. We
show that its nature is entirely different from theoretical inf¬
erence, i.e. from a proof syllogism. Our conclusion is that the
practical syllogism provides the human sciences with a conceptual
framework which can be an alternative to the subsumption-theoretic
ti
covering law model characteristic of the natural sciences.
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INTRODUCTION
Our main interest is the explanation of human
action. We are told by philosophers that to explain
an action is to give the agent's reasons for it. But
there is a disagreement about the nature of reasons
themselves. According to some philosophers, like
Davidson and Pears, reasons are causes of action, so
explanation in terms of reasons is a species of causal
explanation. Others, like Melden, Kenny and Anscombe,
believe that reasons are not causes of action, and
therefore that explanation in terms of reasons cannot
be causal explanation. To resolve this dispute one
way or the other, we need a clear account of the notion
of explanation in general. The range of meaning of
'explanation' in science is very wide, and is different
in different sciences. What scientists understand by
it depends on which model of explansfcion they accept.
In the physical sciences we have two models of
explanation: deductive-nomological and inductive-
probabilistic. According to the former, an event
is explained when it is covered by a law of nature.
Given a law of nature and initial conditions, we can
deduce a description of the event to be explained.
It is more difficult to specify the explanatory role
of the inductive-pipobabilistic model. On this model
to explain an event is to cover it by a probabilistic
law. Rut such a law, as opposed to a causal law,
doesn't give an answer to the question 'Why?'. It
rather justifies certain expectations and predictions.
In the biological and social sciences we meet an
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entirely different kind of explanation, the so-called
teleological explanation. To explain an event on
the teleologioal model is to appeal to a goal or a
reault aimed at, for the sake of which the event
is said to occur. In other words, a present event
is explained by means of a future event, whereas
non-teleological models appeal to present or past
events, but never to future ones. Various philosoph¬
ers and scientists take upon themselves the examinat¬
ion and critical analysis of these different kinds
of explanation.
Some, like Duhem and Mach, suggest that science
(they have in mind physical science) doesn't really
explain anything. All it can do is develop calculi
intended to forecast phenomena. Duhem characterizes
physical theory as follows:
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is
a system of mathematical propositions, deduced
from£ small number of principles which aim to
represent, as simply, as completely, and as
exactly as possible a set of experimental laws.
(The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, p.19)
If we regard a physical theory as a hypothetical
explanation of material reality, we make it, accord¬
ing to him, dependent on metaphysics. An explanation,
then, transcends the methods used by physics. A theory
whose aim is to explain reality consists usually of
two parts. One is simply a representiative part,
which classifies the laws. Another part tries to
explain the reality underlying the phenomena. The
link between these two parts is artificial, for the
representative part has developed on its own, and the
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explanatory part is a kind of parasite. IXihem is
convinced that
it is not to this explanatory part that the theory
owes its power and fertility; far from it. Every¬
thing good in the theory, by virtue of which it
appears as a natural classification and confers
on it the power to anticipate experience, is found
in the representative part, all of that was dis¬
covered by the physicist while he forgot about the
search for explanation. / ..(op. ext., p.32;
When a theory is modified, the representative part
enters ne»*ly completely into the new theory, whereas
the explanatory part is replaced by another explan¬
ation. To show this, IXihem gives the following example.
Descartes gave a theory which represents the phenomena
of simple refraction. It is based on the constant
relation between the sine of the angle of incidence
and the sine of the angeke of refraction. Descartes
also gave an explanation of light effects. Light,
according to him, is only an appearance; the reality
is the pressure caused by the rapid motions of incand¬
escent bodies within a "subtlfi matter" penetrating all
bodies. There is not, according to Duhem, any connect¬
ion between the explanation of light phenomena and the
representation of the law of refraction. While the
latter, even today, forms a major part of elementary
optics, the Cairtesian explanation of light phenomena
has collapsed completely. So, Duhern concludes, we
shouldn't judge scientific theories on the basis of
their explanatory power, but on the basis of their
ability to prediot phenomena. This approach can be
called a predictivist conception of science.
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But according to another view, explanation plays
a vital role in the development of sdience, and cannot
he eliminated from it. Although adherents of this view
don't want to eliminate explanation from science, never¬
theless they are convinced that all the different kinds
of explanation can he reduced to one kind, namely, that
characteristic of the physical sciences. The main aim
of such reduction is to achieve unity of scientific
methods. Hempel, who represents this view, says:
The nature of understanding, in the sense in which
explanation is meant to give us an understanding
of empirical phenomena, is basically the same in
all areas of scientific enquiry; and that the ded¬
uctive and the prohahilist modes of nomological
explanation accommodate vastly more than just the
explanatory arguments of, say, classioal mechanics,
in particular, they accord well aiio with the
character of explanations that deal warth the inf¬
luence of rational deliberation, of oonscious and
subconscious motives, and of ideas and ideals on
the shaping of historical events. In so doing
our schemata exhibit, 1 think, one important aspect
of the methodological unity of all empirical science.
( Explanation in Science and History, p.79)
This emphasis on the unity of scientific rnefhods goes
hand in hand with the assumption that the models of
explanation characteristic of the physical sciences
represent a methodological ideal or standard which
measures the de,< ree of development and pej&ction of
all the other sciences, including the humanities.
This approach can be called methodological monism.
Although there are fundamental differences between
the predictivist conception of science and methodo¬
logical monism, they have one thing in common. Science
is regarded according to both as a single phanomenon,
which has one goal, namely the forecasting of phenomena,
and one method, namely that of the physical sciences.
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13oth these views can be contrasted with methodo¬
logical pluralismf represented by such people as Winch,
Von Wright, Toulmin and others. The methodological
pluralist, even if he agrees with the methodological
monist that there is obvious advantage in having a
unitary concept of explanation, valid for all branches
of science, doesn't believe however that this by itself
guarantees that such a unitary concept oan be found.
The contemprary situation in science shoe something
different. The various sciences are like different
games with a great range and variety of rules and
purposes. Therefore, says Toulmin, it is:
fruitless to look for a single, all-pu_rpose
'scientific method': The growth and evolution
of scientific ideas depends' on no one method,
and will always call for a broad range of diff¬
erent enquiries. Science as a whole - the
activity, its aims, its methods and ideas -
evolves by variation and selection.
(Pbresight and Understanding, p.17)
Methodological pluralists are convinced that the
attempt to reduce teleelogical explanation to the
explanation characteristic of physical sciences is
not only unrealistic but also insane. And anyway,
we cannot talk about the possibility of such reduction
in general, because te'leological explanation itself is
not just a single kind of explanation but several
different patterns.
When we talk about teleological explantion in
biology, what we really have inm mind is functional
explanation. A statement such as "A function of the
kidney is the excretion of urine" can be an example
of functional explanation. Another case of teleological
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explanation is what some philosophers oall purposive
explanation, which is used to explain goal-directed
activity. By the latter we understand a persistence
towards the goal under varying conditions. But goal-
directed activity understood in such a way covers a
very vast range of phenomena: human and animal behav¬
iour on the one hand, and the movements of artificial
machines on the other. Although such machines show
some observable traits of behaviour, we hesitate to
oall it behaviour, because we feel that the nature of
their movements is completely different from the beh¬
aviour of human beings and animals. We are also con¬
vinced that there is a difference between the explan¬
ations of human and animal behaviour. Human beings
can give reasons for their actions, which cannot be
ignored in the explanation of their behaviour, whereas
in explaining animal behaviour we cannot appeal to
reasons. Because of this, some philosophers want to
make a contrast between teleological explanation of
human behaviour and other forms of teleological exp¬
lanation, calling the former explanation in terms or
reasons. According to Von Wright, suoh explanation
is the only "genuine" form of teleological explanation.
Other forms he calls "quasi-teleological" because
although they oan be couched in teleological termin¬
ology, they nevertheless depend for their validity
on the truth of nomic connections, unlike "genuine"
telflfeologioal explanation. Since we are not interested
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here in yunsnrTirg teleological explanation in general,
but in the teleological explanation of human behaviour,
let us concentrate on the possibility of assimilating
the latter to the mode of explanation characteristic
of the physical sciences.
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Chapter I - THE ATTEMPT TO TRANSLATE MENTAL TERMS INTO PHYSICAL
In order to eliminate teleology from the explanation of
human behaviour, the methodological monist can adopt the foll¬
owing policy. He can try to reduce psychological terms to phys¬
ical terms in the description and explanation of action. By so
doing, he thinks we can achieve unity of the language of science.
Some, like Skinner, believe that we achieve even more, namely
getting rid of unobservable entities like intentions, motives,
etc., propositions about which cannot be verified. In general
we get rid of "metaphysics". There are two possible ways of
eliminating psychological terms. Firstly we can reduce (some
philosophers also talk of translation) psychological terms to
physical terms describing bodily movements. Secondly, we can
search for states of the brain which correlate in lawlike fashion
with beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.. The first task is method¬
ological, concerning the description and explanation of human
action. The second seems to be ontologioal, implying something
abort what the mental is, and involving the mind-body problem.
So let us separate these two tasks and concentrate first on
the former.
Any discussion concerning the possibility or impossibility
of reducing mental concepts to physical ones should be preceded
by an analysis of the very concept of the mental, because it is
quite far from clear what philosophers understand by it. Mental
terms are supposed to designate phenomena which are non-spatial,
private, holistic, intentional, etc..
Not being in space has been regarded, since Descartes' dist¬
inction between res cogitans and res extensa, as the main
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feature of mental phenomena. But contemporary philosophers
are sceptical about this distinction, since there are some
physical phenomena, like temperature, which also are not in
space. A physical thing has a temperature, and temperature
itself is not a thing, it is a prpferty of the thing, like
pain is a property of living organisms. So not being in
space oannot be a clear criterion of the distinction between
the mental and the physical.
It is not very clear what philosophers understand by the
holism of the mental. Some suggest that when we explain an
action in terns of the agent's beliefs and desires these beliefs
and desires do not come individually, but are always tied up
together, and usually imply some other phenomena such as memory,
rationality, etc.. Suppose John is going to a shop to buy bread.
To explain his action we have to pick out not only his de sire
to buy bread and his belief that he can buy it in this partic¬
ular shop, but also his desire to buy fresh bread, because stale
bread will not do. We also tacitly presuppose that John is
rational, that he will not go to a furniture shop to buy bread.
The concept of rationality is ineliminable from every axplanation
of human behaviour. We have to presuppose that, in general, an
agent will tend to believe what is true, that he will not tolerate
inconsistent beliefs, etc.. Some philosophers argue, however,
that holism understood in suoh a way is not a distinctive feat¬
ure of mental phenomena. Fbr when we are giving a causal exp¬
lanation of a physical event we also have to take into account
a lot of factors, which constitute a necessary and sufficient
condition. If I want, for example, to give a full account why
a short-circuit caused a fire in a house I hjfre to mention suoh
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factors as the presence of oxygen, the presence of inflammable
material, the absence of a suitably-piaced sprinkler, etc..
Although this is true, it is not possible to talk about holism
in the latter context. There is a contingent relation between
all the facotors involved in physical causality, whereas there
is a conceptual connection between beliefs, desires, rationality,
etc.. It is not possible to ascribe beliefs or desires to a
person one by one. A particular belief or desire has its meaning
only in connection with other beliefs, preferences, intentions,
etc., but taken from the whole context it loses its meaning.
This fact generates the so-called indeterminacy of translation,
which is a serious problem for the monist who wants to reduce
mental descriptions to physical ones.
As far as the criterion of privacy is concerned, there
is a lot of confusion. There are different uses of the predicate
'private', but only one is interesting for us, namely, that
only an agent can know his mental states or inner experiences,
nobody else can. According to .Descartes and his followers,
private knowledge of innir experience presents no problem; it
is as possible as knowledge of public objeots. Wittgenstein
denies the possibility of such knowledge; he believes that it
is impossible for a person to use ivords which refer to private
objects, that is, objects which nobody else could - even in
principle - know of^the impossibility here is conceptual"). It
is impossible because there is no such thing as private knowledge,
as there is no such thing as a private language. Knowledge by
its very meaning implies that there are criteria for its correct¬
ness, like following a rule is a criterion for speaking a lang¬
uage. 3ut such criteria are not available for a speaker of a
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private language. Neither memory or anything else can be suoh
a criterion. When my memory is entirely wrong I haven't
available any further criterion to correct it. So knowledge
of inner experience has to be public, based on observable
behaviour, if it is going to be knowledge at all. Some phil¬
osophers believe that "this means that every statement about
mental states oan be reduced to statements about observable
behaviour or dispositions to behaviour. But despite the fact
that knowledge of this kind is public there are still differences
between the ways in which an observer and an agent acquire it.
An observer's knowledge is inferential, he makes inferences on
the basis of observed behaviour, whereas the agent's knowledge
is non-inferential, based on direct experience. That is why
we don't ask, for instance, how he knows that he is in pain.
There is no room for such a question. Does this mean that an
agent's knowledge is incorrigible, end that he is the final
authority as far as propositions about his mental states are
concerned? In some oases, "Like pain, he is, because an essent¬
ial feature of pain is the person's feeling it. As far as
motives, intentions, etc., are concerned, there is room for
error, since in some oases a psyohoanalyst oan know the agent's
motives better than he himself does. By observing an agent's
behaviour, the psychoanalyst can make correct inferences and
even contradict the agent's own expression of his intentions
or motives, when there is an inconsistency between what the
agent said and what he is doing or not doing. The inconsistency
could be because of the agent's deliberate deceiving of others
or his own self-deception. But there are no clear boundary
lines between the two. So there is a meaning of 'private',
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namely, that the agent's knowledge of his mental states
is non-inferential, which can "be a distinctive mark
of the mental.
According to Brentano, the main mark of the mental,
as opposed to the physical, is intentionality. He says:
Every mental phenomenoh is characterized by what a
scholastic of the Middle Ages called intentional (and
also mental) inexistence (inexistenz) of an object
(Gegenstand), and what we would call, although not in
entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content,
a direction upon an object (by which we are not to
understand a reality in this case, or an immaaent object¬
ivity). Eaoh one includes something as object within
itself, although not always in the same way. In pres¬
entation something is presented, in judgements some¬
thing is affirmed or denied, in love (something is)
loved, in hate (something) hated, in desire (something)
desired, etc..
The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena
pp.50-1.
Some philesophers, like Kathleen V.Wilkes in her book
Physicalism (Routledge, 1978), suggest that intentionality
cannot be the criterion for sensations. But even if this
is right, there is still a large number of mental phenomena
such as believing, wishing, hoping, thinking, etc., which
are intentional, and it is usually phenomena such as these
which we cite in the ordinary explanation of action. So
in such explanation we must use intentional language. But
we do not use intentional language when we describe and
explain physical phenomena. There are the following criteria
for identifying an intentional sentence:
1) A sentence is intentional if it contains a singular tenri
such that whether that term has reference is independent of
the truth-value of the sentence. For example 'John believes
in Zeus' - the truth or falsehood of this sentence or its
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negation is independent of our judgements about the existence
of Zeus. 2) A sentence is intentional if the truth-value of
the whole sentence is independent of the truth-value of the
sentence it contains. For example, 'John believes that today
is Friday', in which 'Today is Friday' can vary without varying
the truth-value of the whole sentence. 3) A sentences is
intentional if replacing the singular term it contains by a
term with a different meaning but the same reference will affect
the truth-value of the complete sentence. For example, 'John
believes that Aristotle is the author of the Ethics', in which
if 'Aristotle' is replaced by 'the disciple of Plato' , the truth-
value of the whole sentence may change. 4) An intentional sent¬
ence may contain a term which does not refer to any specific thing.
For example, 'John wants a wife'. So philosophers or psychologists
who want to reduce intentional language into an adequate non-
intentional language for the description and explanation of human
behaviour have to show that it is possible to translate ihfentional
sentences into extensional ones without changing the truth-conditions.
Suppose they would like to translate the intentional sentence
'John believe that today is Friday' into an extensional one. The
given sentence is intentional because if the word 'Friday' is
replaced by a coreferential epression, say 'the first of January',
the sentence may change its truth-value. It has fceen suggested
that the sentence will no longer be intentional if it is interpreted
as expressing a certain attitude of John towards the sentence
'Today i£ Friday', rather than towards what is stated by the
sentence. Thus we will have as translation 'John believes in (accepts)
the sentence "Today is Friday" '. But suppose John is Polish
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and doesn't know English. Then although it is true that
John believes that today is Friday, it is not true that
John accepts -the sentence "Today is Friday", since John
doesn't understand English and cannot accept English
sentence. Let us then try a different interpretation, like
the following: 'John acoepts a sentence which is a trans¬
lation of the English sentence "Today is Friday" into some
other language*. But this interpretation will not do the
,job either. We have to presuppose that John understands
the meaning of some sentence, no matter what language he
speaks, and understanding itself is an intentional concept.
To resolve this dilemma behaviourists adopt the follerwing
policy. They try to provide "physical" tranllations of
belief-sentences. Some of them describe beliefs in terms
of responses to certatin stimuli. On this view to say that
a person believes in something is to say that he makes some
response in the presence of the object of his belief. But
it is already clear that this definition is not good enough
because it is possible for a person to believe in something
which doesn't exist, so that it is in principle impossible
for him to be in the presence of the object of his belief.
Suppose the behaviourist modifies his definition and says
that a person believes in something if, when in the presence
of some stimuli, he makes a response which is appropriate
to the object of his belief. In general, a person bBlieves
a proposition p if and only if He behaves dr is disposed
to behave in a way which is appropriate to p. But 'approp¬
riate' is an intentional term itself, which cannot be spec¬
ified without appealing to a person's beliefs. So this
attempt too leads to failure.
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Some behaviourists and philosophers like William
James try to interpret beliefs in terms of fulfilment and
disruption, or satisfaction and surprise. On this view,
to say that A believes that X will occur within a certain
period means that A is in a bodily state which would be
satisfied if and only if X occurs in this period. So if
John believes that today is Friday, this means that he is
in a state which would be satisfied if and only if today
is Friday, and which would be disrupted if today is not
Friday. Suppose John looks into his diary and it says
that today is Friday. Now, according to the behaviourist,
he is in a state which can be called satisfaction. Jut we
have to assume that when John was looking into his diary
he believed that it tells the truth, that he believed that
the diary can give him that information. We wanted to tran¬
slate the statement about belief into statements about sat¬
isfaction, but to do that we tacitly presupposed ether
beliefs. We also presupposed that John understands the
meaning <Sf the word 'Friday* (given that he speaks English).
So this last attempt too is condemned to failure. We do
not need to look at other attempts to eliminate intention-
ality from statements about beliefs in order to see that
such an attempt is in principle impossible. In general we
have to assume that a person uses some language, and using
language implies understanding the meanings of words and
sentences; and these references to understanding and meaning
imply intentionality. For simplicity, we confined ourselves
to the concept of belief, but what we said is true about
all intentional concepts. Intentional language oannot, in
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principle, be eliminated from the description and explan¬
ation of human behaviour.
There are also some other reasons why mental or psych¬
ological concepts cannot be eliminated from the explanation
of human behaviour. Firstly, an action cannot be identified
without reference to intentionality, so its explanation
too is impossible without using intentional language. Sup¬
pose we want to identify the action of signalling a turn.
The methocW.ogical monist may say that we can identify it
by the bodily movement alone, i.e. extending an arm. Sup¬
pose however that there are similar circumstances but a
person extends his arm not in order to signal a turn but
in order to ray hallo to his friend. The bodily movements
in both oases are the same but the actions are different,
bhat distinguishes one action from another is the agent's
intention. There .are also a lot of oases in which we can¬
not observe bod ily movements but still can talk about
actions. Suppose I see my friend sitting in a chair, and
when I ask him if he is taking a rest his answer is 'No,
I am medi tating'. It is obvious that in this, and other
similar cases, we cannot identify an agent's action on the
basis of his bodily movements. So intentions are indispen¬
sable for the identification of actions. Since identifiel¬
ation of the thing to be c-xnlained is essential for explan¬
ation, intentions are ineliminable from the explanation of
human actions.
Secondly, we cannot leave out in our explanation of
actions an agent's own impression of his intentions, desires,
eto..
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But they are available to him only under psychological
descriptions. The agent's account of his desires is
important in the explanation of his actions because
very often they operate only becart.se he is aware of
their existenoe. This very awareness helps them to
operate. The agent's identification of desires, beliefs,
etc., as his own enables him to plan the action and
control it. In general it is not the agent's actual
situation which explains what he does, but his concept¬
ion of the situation and his picture of himself as an
agent. Of course, it may be necessary to refer to the
actual situation in explaining his success or failure
in tnanslating his intentions into action. But if we
eliminate an agent's account of his reasons, and inter¬
pret his action only in terms of bodily movements, we
cannot talk about the suocess or failure of his action.
Suppose I see someone taking a book from a shelf, but
it happened that he took the wrong book. If 1 describe
his action only in terms of bodily movments I will not
be able to say that his action was a failure. It
follows that if we want to explain his action we must
use intentional language.
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Chapter II - THE SEARCH FOR EMPIRICAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN MENTAL STATES AND BRAIN STATE.;
We have already mentioned that the methodological
monist can adopt another policy, namely, to search for
brain states which correlate in lawlike fishion with
beliefs, desires, intentions, i.e. mental states. If
we find such correlations then it will be possible to
describe and explain human actions in purely physical
terms. It can also mean that mentalistic psychology
can at some stage be reduced to neurophysiology. This
has become the main task of some identity theories. There
are two kinds of identity theory: some assert identity
between types of mental and physical states, so they can
be called type-identity theories (Armstrong's and Peigl's
theories belong to this group), while others, such as
Davidson's anomalous monism, deny the type-identity thesis
and assert identity only between particular mental and
physical states. Adherents of thfe token-identity thesis
are not methodological monists because they deny the poss¬
ibility of psychophysical laws and hence of the reduction
of psychology to neurophysiology. Since we are interested
here in methological monism let us concentrate on the
type-identity theory only.
There are different kinds of identification. On the
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one hand there are analytic identifications, like '4=2',
which are taue in virtue of definitions and principles of
arithmetic or logic. Another kind of analytic identificat¬
ion involves synonymy, like that between bachelor and un¬
married man, which is true in virtue of the meaning of the
terms. On the other hand we have empirical identity statements
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like •Plato is the author of the Republic', and theoretical
identity statements in science like 'Temperature is the
mean kindtic energy of molecules'. We are told by adherents
of the type-identity theory that identity between the types
of mental and brain state , is similar to theoretical ident¬
ification in science. If so, then the type-identity thesis
should be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical facts, and
cannot be decided by philosophers alone. But this is not
quite so, for the following reasons. When identity is ass¬
erted between types of mental and physical state, this can
be understood as identity of reference. The two expressions
•mental state of type x' and 'brain state o^ type y' are
said to refer to the same events or states if and only if
whenever a person is in a mental state of type x he is also
in a brain state of type y. So the factual content of type-
identity statements is exhausted by the corresponding corr¬
elation statements. When identity is thus understood as
identity of reference, it fails to be a significant thesis
of identity, because, as Kim pointed out;
Not only the psycho-physical identity statement, but
also the corresponding "psycho-physical interaction
statement", the corresponding "psycho-physical double-
aspect statement", and so on, are all confirmable or
refutable by fact. And the very same evidence will
confirm all of them or none of them; the very same
evidence will refute all of them or none of than.
("On the Psycho-physical IdAtfity Theory",
American Philosophical quarterly 1966, p.228)
This is a serious problem for advocates of the identity
theory. If it has the same factual support as its rivals
there is no reason for choosing it rather than any other
theory. Some adherents of the identity theory argue, how¬
ever, that despite this fact there are some philosophical
reasons for preferring it. Firstly, they argue, the identity
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theory leads to scientific simplicity, because the identif¬
ication of mental with physical states enables the reduction
of mentalistic psychology to neurophysiology. Secondly,
it leads to ontological simplicity, to 3 simpler scheme
of entities. H.Feigl writes:
The step from parallelism to the identity view is ess¬
entially a matter of philosophical interpretation. The
principle of parsimony as it is employed in the sciences
contributes only one reason in favour of monism. If
isomorphism is admitted, the dualistic (parallelistic)
position may be retained, but no good grounds can be
adduced for such a duplication of realities or even of
"aspects" of reality.
('The "Mental" and the "Physical", p»461, in
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vo1.
Let us now look more closely at how scientific simp¬
licity can be achieved by the type-identity theory. When
one theory is reduced to another the laws of the reduced
theory can be deduced from those of the theory to which it
is reduced. But the reduced and reducing theories usually
have different concepts, so we need so-called "connecting
principles", which are statements relating concepts of both
theories. If we want to reduce classical thermodynamics to
£
statistical mechanics, for example, a statement such as
'Teperature is the mean kinetic energy of molecules' can
serve as a connecting principle. The above identification
can be interpreted as follows. Whenever gas has such and
such temperature, it has such and such mean kinetic energy,
and conversely. The advocates of the type-identity theory
suggest that in order to reduce mentalistic psychology to
neurophysiology we need similar connecting principles, and
they suggest that identity statements between types of mental
and brain states can serve. And as we said before, these
identity statements are based on nothing more than the
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corresponding- correlation statements. But fcuch correlation
statements are not possible, for the reasons we gave in
the previous chp^ter. We showed that mental concepts are
holistic, that they have different truth-conditions from
physical concepts, so that it is in principle impossible
to reduce one to the other. The identification is also
impossible because of the fundamental difference between
physical objects or states and mental states. Fhysical
objects have a sort of underlying structure (you can call
it real essence if you like). When obsemble characteristics
are not a decisive criterion of identity, we have available
a more fundamental criterion, namely their atomio structure.
But our psychological terms do not carry the assumption of
a real essence, discoverable in principle, which in a case
of conflict can help us decide the case one way or another.
There is no possible candidate for a non-physical real
essence. Suppose that a mental state's real essence could
be identified with its causal or functional role. If so,
then every type of mental state could be associated with
a certain causal role. But this is not possible, since
a causal role of a mental state would be specified a priori.
Pain would be nothing but the cause of pain behaviour.
My intention of going to a cinema willxause my g- ing to
the cinema, etc.. This means that new discoveries will
not be able to change our preliminary specification of the
causal role of mental states. If there is no possibility
of regrouping in our classification of menial states thftik
essence cannot be identified with their causal role. The
same holds for the identification of mental state's real
essence with their functional role.
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It is also possible to argue that the question
whether a given science is reducible to another can: ot
be raised without reference to some parttcalar stage of
development of the two disciplines in question. It was
not possible, for instance, to decide in general whether
reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics was possible,
before both sciences had reached some stage of development.
First of all, the laws of both reduced and reducing sciences
have to be oonfirmed independently of each other before
reduction. But the situation is different in the case of
psychology and neurophysiology. So far we are not able
to establish psychological law3, and the question is whether
it is in principle possible to establish any. But this
second problem oan be discussed in detail later on. What
follows here is that the argument from scientific simplicity
cannot work.
A different criticism of the typ-identity thesis was
presented by S.Kripke in his two papery "Naming and Necessity"
in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Davidson and
Harman, and "Ideiii-ty and Necessity" in Identity and Indiv¬
iduation, edited by Munitz. We are told, says Kripke,
that mental states are identical with brain states, for
example, that pain is G-fibre stimulation. 3ut 'C-fibre
stimulation' and 'pain' are rigid designators, by which
he means terms that designate the same object in all poss¬
ible worlds. And because they are rigid designators, the
objects that they designate are^ if identical^then necessarily
identical. But we can imagine a situation in which a person
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has C-fibre stimulation but doesn't feel pain. The
possibility that they might come apart is inconsistent
with their being necessarily identical. The advocates
of the identity theory have to explain this inconsistency
away, but according to Kripke they cannot do so.
fln opponent who wfeald like to reject kripke's crit¬
icism can argue that the identity of mental states with
physical states is accidental, so it coudn't be necessary.
Kriy.ke's reply to this argument is as follows. If somebody
accepts that every object is necessarily self-identical,
then he has to accept that an object which is identical
with it is also necessarily identical with it. bhat made
some philosophers believe that some identity-statements
between rigid designators are contingent is, according to
Kripke, their failure to distinguish between necessity and
a prioricity. They wrongly believe that only a priori
identity statements can be necessary, whereas a posteriori-
identity statements must be contingent. Kripke argues that
the concepts of necessity and a priorioity are not synony¬
mous. He gives the following example. Suppose 1 want to
know whether such and such a number is prime. This fact
can be known a priori, but this doesn't mean that it must
be known a priori. computer, for example, cein tell me
that the number is prime; I then believe this on the basis
of a posteriori evidence. It follows that there are necessary
truths which can be known a posteriori. We know a posteriori
(it was discovered by astronomers) that the Evening Star
is identical with the Morning Star, but if it is true that
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they are identical, then they are necessarily identical,
because the terms 'the Evening Star* and 'the Morning Star'
are rigid designators.
Suppose someone would like to meet Kripke's argument
by showing that 'pain' and 'C-fibre stimulation' are not
rigid designators. According to Kripke, 'pain* has to be
a rigid designator because the object is picked out by its
essential property. And it will be absurd to say that that
very sensation could have existed without being pain. Supp¬
ose 'C-fibre stimulation' is not a rigid designator, then,
says kripke, let us pick out its designation by another
property which is really essential to it, for example, a
specific type of configuration of molecules. Then this will
bring us back to the same problem. So this argument too
cannot be sound.
Some philosophers believe that in some ca. es it is
possible for a person not to feel pain, although his pain
exists. If so, then pain and the corresponding brain-state
always come together, and Kripke's claim that they can come
apart is unjustified. To show that pain can exist without
the person feeling it, Demos in his article "Self-Deception"
(Journal of Philosophy. 1960) gives the following example.
Suppose someone with a headache goes to the cinema where
hie attention is engrossed by an exciting film. Because
he is excited by the film he doesn't feel any headache, but
as soon as the film is over the headache comes again. Acc¬
ording to Demos, we can say that the headache continued in
existence all the time, but the person didn't notice it
because he was engrossed in the film. Thus pain could exist
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without the person feeling it. But this argumement is
wrong for the same reasons as the previous one. Feeling
pain is its essential property, so we cannot say that it
could exist without the person feeling it. Kripke is
right when he says 'The experience itself has to be this
very experience, and 1 cannot say that it is a contingent
property of the pain I now have that it is a pain*
("Identity and Necessity", p.161). Demos has given us
no reason to say that the headache existed unfelt, rather
than just that the fi],goer had a headache before and
after, but not during, the film. So Kripke's claim that
mental states and brain states are not necessarily ident¬
ical, and therefore not identical at all, cannot be
refuted by this argument.
Kripke's argument sounds quite convincing, but
in order for it to be decisive we need a clear account
of the identity of events and states; unfortunately,
he doesn't provide us with such an account. For this
dispute to be settled, both sides need to understand
what is involved in the identity of events, what is the
criterion for saying that one event or state is ident¬
ical with another. The proponent of the identity thesis
has the stronger obligation to make this point clear.
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Chapter III - THE THESIS THAT EXPLANATION IN TERMS OF
REASONS IS CAUSAL EXPLANATION
Other methodological monists, like Pears, try to trans¬
form an explanation in terms of reasons into a causal expl¬
anation without reducing psychological terms to physical ones.
To determine whether such an attempt can be successful, we
must first examine the notion of aausality itself and make
clear what notion of causality is involved here. Aristotle
associated causes with unobservable forces or powers which
necessarily produce corresponding effects. In the Metaphysics
he wrote 'When the agent and patient meet suitably to their
powers, the one acts and the other is acted on of necessity'
(Book IX, Ch. V). Spinoza believed that the connection bet¬
ween cause and effect is a logical connection of some sort.
He said 'Given a determinant cause, the effect follows of
necessity, and without its cause, no effeot follows* (Ethics
Book I, Axiom III). It was Hume who freed Western philos¬
ophers from •associating a cause either with the obscure notion
of unobservable power or with the notion of logical necessity.
According to him, the essence of the notion of causation
consists in a "regular sequence" or "constant conjunction"
between pairs of events in nature. Necessity or power do
not exist in nature but are found in human minds, when we
are determined to believe in necessity by observing a constant
conjunction of two events. Modern philosophers, although
they entirely accepted Hume's criticism of the association
of causality with logical necessity or power, have not adopted
his doctrine as it stands. Instead of talking of constant
con .junction of events as the real essence of the notion of
causality, they say that every causal statement implies by
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its very meaning a general proposition asserting a universal
connection between kinds of events} in other words, it implies
a law. Modern philosophers also disagree with Hume that a
mere constant conjunction of events constitutes the essence
of causality. Not all events which follow each other in
invariable sequence are causally related, and not every gen¬
eral proposition asserting a sequence between kinds of events
is regarded as a causal law. Law-like generalizations oan
be distinguished from accidental generalizations by the
place they occupy within a scientific theory. As R.3.3raith-
waite said, a law-statement is one which 'appears as a deduction
from higher-level hypotheses which have been established indep¬
endently of the statement' (Scientific Explanation, p.303).
Also, in spite of Hume's criticism of associating causality
with necessity, some philosophers bel«4ve that causality is
some sort of necessary connection after all. But they do not
think it is logical necessity, they call it physical necessity
and analyze it in terms of counterfactual conditionals. Such
counterfactuals justify us in making inferences not merely
as to what has happened or will happen, but also as to what
would have been the case if some event, whtfedh did not in fact
occur, had occurred. Counterfactuals themselves are explained
on the nomic-inferential model.
Although the above doctrine of causality sounds better
than past accounts, it is not without problems. To ecplain
causality it appeals to counterfactuals. But, as Kim showed
in his paper "Causes and Counterfaciatals" (Journal of Philo¬
sophy. 1973)» on the one hand counterfactual dependency is
too broad to pin down causal dependency, and on the other
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hand it is too narrow to capture causal dependency. It is
too broad beoause it captures some sort of logical or anal¬
ytical dependency, as in the following examples: 'If yest¬
erday had not been Monday, today would not be Tuesday' or
'If my sister had not given birth at t, I would not have
become an aunt at t'. Sometimes it also captures an accid¬
ental connection like 'if this coin were a dime it would be
made of silver'. It is too narrow because it doesn't capture
cases of over-determination, such as when two bullets pierce
a man's heart simultaneously and they are each independently
sufficient for his death. It follows then that it is not
enough to say merely that a law-like statement, as opposed
a
to an accidental generalization, is a statement which implies
a counterfaotual. It has to imply proper counterfactuals.
But in order to specify which counterfactuals are proper
we have to appeal to laws, and say that they are those which
are supported by laws. But such an explanation cannot be
satisfactory because it is circular. If we are not able to
give a satisfactory account of the notion of causation maybe
we should give up using the notion. Some philosophers think
that instead of talking about causal laws we can talk about
probablistic laws. But Inductive-Trobablistic models of
explanation are far from being unproblematic, so they cannot
be a simple alternative to causal explanation. Being aware
of these problems involved in causal explanation, we can now
concentrate on a more concrete problem, namely everyday life
explanation in terms of causes.
In ordinary life we are not so much interested, as in
the physical sciences, in types of occurrence which usually
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or normally occur, on the contrary, everyday causal quest¬
ions are inspired by the wish to explain the particular
events whose occurrence is puzzling because it is a dep¬
arture from the normally expected course of events. In
ordinary life wemake singular oausal statements. The quest¬
ion is what meaning of 'cause' is presupposed here, and on
what basis are we justified in waking such statements. If
the meaning of 'cause' lies, as Hume thought, in the const¬
ant conjunction of events or in a kind of regularity as
modern thinkers suppose, then it follows that we oannot
observe regulaafcty in an individual case. In ordinary
life we also seem to make inferences about effects from causes
without any appeal to necessity. How else, if by appealing
neither to universality nor to necessity, can we grasp the
notion of cause in everyday li-fe?
According to Anscdmbe, knowledge of causes is possible
without any satisfactory analysis of what is involved in
causation. In her paper "Causality and Determination"
(inaugural Lecture, Cambridge University Press, 1971)» she
writes:
How does one show someone that he has the ooncept cause?
We may wish to say: only by having such a word in his
vocabulary. If so, then the manifest possession of the
concept presupposes the mastery of much else in language.
I mean: the word 'cause* can be added to a language in
which are already represented many causal concepts. A
small selection: scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, burn,
knoek over, keep off, squash, make (e.g. noises, paper
boats), hurt. But if we care to imagine languages in
which no special causal concepts are represented, then
no description of the use of a word in such languages
will be able to present it as meaning cause. Nor will
it even contain words for natural kinds of stuff, nor
yet words equivalent to 'body', 'wind', or 'fire'. For
learning to use special causal verbs is part and parcel
of learning to apply the concepts answering to these,
and many other, substantives.
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Lven if Anscombe iB right that the ordinary man can make
and understand causal statements without being able to
specify the meaning of the term •cause', it is the phil¬
osophers' business to make analytically explicit the
meaning of the term as used in ordinary language.
According to Davidson, the ordinary meaning of
•cause' is not fundamentally different from the scientific
one. When in ordinary life we say that a caused b we
believe that there exists some causal law, even if we
don't know what it is, in virtue of which a is a necess¬
ary and sufficient condition for the existence of b.
Let us quote his own words:
And very often, I think, our justification for accept¬
ing a singular causal statement is that we have reason
to believe an appropriate causal law exists, though
we do not know what it is. Generalizations like 'If
you strike a wellMnade match hard enough against a
properly prepared surface, the^ other conditions being
favourable, it will light' owe their importance not
to the fact that we can hope eventually to render
them untendentious and exceptionless, but rather to
the fact that they summarize much of our evidence for
believing that full-fledged causal laws exist oovering
events we wish to explain.
("Causal Relations", Journal of Philosophy, 1967)
To say that a singular causal statement implies that there
is some corresponding law, even if we cannot know it, is
not an obvious thing to say; so in order to make us believe
in his thesis Davidson should give us some more reasons.
Mackie, who like Davidson thinks that singular
causal statements can be analyzed in terns of neoessity
and law-like regularity , presents a better elaborated
and justified thesis, so let us look at his theory.
He goes through the following stages in his analysis.
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A cause of an event is said to be an INUS condition of
it, and the notion of INUS condition is interpreted in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, which
are in turn analysed in terms of counterfactuals, which
follow from a corresponding universal law. Maokie defines
a cause of an event as follows: 'the so-oalled cause is,
and is known to be, an insufficient but necessary part of
a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient
for the result'("Causes and Conditions", American Phil¬
osophical Quarterly, 1965)* For example, in saying that
a short-circuit was the cause of the fire in the house we
mean that the short-circuit was an insufficient but nec¬
essary part of a condition such as the presence of infl¬
ammable material, the absence of a suitably-placed sprink¬
ler, etc., which itself was sufficient, although unnecess-
a»y for the occurrence of a fire. But since the fire
might havt been caused not by the short-circuit, but by
the throwing of a lighted cigarette or in some other way,
w have to add that no other sufficient condition of the
housds catching fire was present on this occasion. Let
A stand for the short-circuit, B for the presence of
inflammable material, and G for the absence of a suitably
placed sprinkler. The conjunction ABC represents a suff¬
icient condition of the fire which contains no redundant
factor and ws called by Mackie a minimal sufficient cond¬
ition for the fire. Let DEF, GHI, etc., be all the other
minimal sufficient conditions. Then, says Mackie: 'the
formula 'ABO or OEF or GHI or ...' represents a necessary
and sufficient condition for the fire, each of its disjuncts
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suoh as ABC, represents a minimal sufficeint condition,
and each conjunct in each minimal sufficient (Condition
such as A, represents an INUS condition' (loc» cit.).
Now it is clear what Mackie means by a necessary Condition.
It is the disjunction of all the sufficiint conditions,
or sometimes the only sufficiint condition (when the
effect can be produced by only one cause). 'Necessary
condition' and 'sufficient condition' are in turn expl¬
ained on the model of counterfaotual statements. The
statement 'A short-circuit here was a necessary condition
of a fire in this house' is related to the counterfactual
conditional 'If a short-circuit had not occurred here,
this house would not have caught fire', and the state¬
ment 'A short-circuit here was a sufficient condition
of a fire in this house' is related to the factual cond¬
itional 'Since a short-circuit occurred here, this house
caught fire*. Thus to relate singular statements about
necessity and sufficiency to non-material conditionals
is to refer indirectly to certain universal propositions.
•Thus, if we said that a short-circuit here was a necess¬
ary condition for a fire in this house, we should be say¬
ing that there are true universal propositions from which,
together with true statements about the characteristics
of this house, and together with the supposition that a
short-circuit did not occur here, it would follow that
the house did not catch fire' (loo, oit.). And, similarly,
to say that a short-circuit here was a sufficient condition
for a fire in this house is to say that there are true
universal propositions from whihh, together with true
statements about the characteristics of this house, and
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the statement that a short-circuit occurred, it follows
that a fire occurred. Although Mackie's theory needs
some refinements, as Kim showed in his paper "Causes and
Events: Mackie on Causation" (Journal of Philosophy, 1971),
most philosophers agree that it constitutes a notable cont¬
ribution to the analysis of causation in general, and of
singular causal statements in particular.
Now let us concentrate on the problems concerning
the possible application of Mackie's regularity theory
of causation to the explanation of human actions. Mackie's
theory says that every singular causal statement implies,
by its very meaning, a general proposition asserting a
universal connection between kinds of events. Given that,
and the assumption that explanation in terms of reasons
is causal explanation (Davidson's view), it follows that
statements citing reasons are intelligible only by refer¬
ence to some corresponding lawlike generalization. Some
philosophers find this conclusion unacceptable. According
to Hart and Honore, 'the statement that a person acted
for a given reason does not require for its defence gener¬
alizations asserting connexions between types of events.
... It is no part of the meaning of such a statement that
if the same circumstances recurred he would do the same'
(Causation in the Law. Oxford, 19591 P*21). When we make
assertions about reasons we appeal to rationality or int¬
elligibility or both but not to some general law. Ration¬
ality, given the reasons and oircumstances, tells us what
is or was the appropriate thing to do. For example if I
want a book, and the only way to get it is to borrow a copy
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from my friend, then the rational tfcing for me to do is
to ask my friend to lervi it to me. Rationality in this
context consists in a successful choice of means to end.
It implies a teleological explanation whioh has logical
peculiarities of its own (which we do not want to analyze
here) and which is entirely different from causal explan¬
ation.
However, advocates of the opposite view can argue
that even in the above cases, when we try to explain an
action in terms of reasons, we have to appeal to some
sort of generalization after all. They are right, but
the sort of generalization required is altogether diff¬
erent from that involved in causal accounts. It is true,
for example, that given some reasons and circumstances on
one occasion and similar reasons and circumstances on
another, we expect that a person will act in a similar
way. But this generalization is not based on a causal
law which says that given these reasons and this situation
a person will act in such and such a wayj it is more like
a recipe which says that, given these circumstances and
this endj, a rational person would (or should) use such
and such means to his end. Let us quote Hart and Honore'
again:
The general knowledge used here is knowledge of the
familiar 'way* to produceT by manipulating things,
certain types of change which do not normally occur
without our intervention. If formulated, they are
broadly framed generalizations, more like
recipes in which we assert that doing one thing will
•under normal conditions* produce another, than
statements of 'invariable sequence between a complex
set of specified conditions and an event of the
given kind . (Causation in the Law, p.29)
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If the explanation of actions in terms of reasons
were based on lawlike generalizations, then we should be
able to bring it under the pattern of explanation charact¬
eristic of physical sciences, i.e. the nomological-deductive
model of explanation. This consists of two parts, the so-
called explanaas and explanandum. The former contains two
sets of premises: a set of singular statements describing
relevant initial conditions, find a set of general laws.
The explanandum describes the phenomenon to be explained.
This can be represented by the following schema:
0^, Cg, ... statements of initial conditions
, L_, ... L^. general laws
E description of the empirical
phenomenon to be explained
For this schema to be an adequate explanation, it must
satisfy various conditions, one of which is that the
explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans.
But when we try to explain actions on this nomological-
deductive model the following difficulty will arise. Very
often a fuller description of an action can be at the same
time its explanation, whereas the deductive-nomological
model requires that the description of the explanandum
should be separated from its explanans. To see this more
clearly, let us look at an example given by Anscombe in her
book Intention (Blackwell, 1957)• We see a person moving
his arm up and down; when we ask what he is doing, a fuller
description of his action 'He is operating the pump' may
be an answer to our question. To the question why he is
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operating the puijp the answer may be 'He is replenishing
the water supply'. By giving the further description
'He is poisoning the inhabitants' we can explain why he
is replenishing the water supply. We have here one action
with four descriptionsi and each is related to the next as
a description of means to an end. The last description is
treated as an end which explains the agent's intention.
It is clear that we cannot pick out one of these descrip¬
tions as an explanandum, and another as part of its explan-
ans (an initial condition). For they describe the same
event, whereas explanans and explanandum are supposed to
describe different events. So human actions cannot be
explained on the nomological-deductive model.
Further proof that explanation in terms of reasons
cannot be causal explanation can be derived from the fact
that an agent's own knowledge of his action and his reasons
for it is direct or non-inferential, in no way dependent
on a lawlike generalization. Firstly, let us concentrate
on the thesis that the agent's knowledge of his action,
given his beliefs and desires, is non-inferential. We have
to assume of course that he knows that it is possible for
him to per-form the action, that circumstances will not pre¬
vent him from acting. This knowledge is inferential. But
given it, and his reasons, he knows in a non-inferential
way what action he intends to do. Some philosophers suggest
that this knowledge of one's future action is based on the
observation of one's past behaviour. One observes that in
the past when he had such and such reasons one behaved in
such and such a way, and on the present occasion, because
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o»ie has Similar reasons one infers that one will behave
similarly. This would make the agent's knowledge of what
he is going to do inferential after all. But this view
cannot be right. If the agent's knowledge of his aotion
were based on the observation of previous cases, it would
follow that in a situation where he has some reasons for
the first time he wouldn't know what he is going to do,
which is not true (if he has decided what he is going to
do). In general, philosophers who believe that this kind
of knowledge is inferential misunderstand the very nature
of the agent's knowledge of his future action. They assume
that it is similar to the prediction of a future event.
And certainly, such a prediction has to be based on an ind¬
uctive inference. Whereas the agent's declaration that he
will perforin his action, will go to the cinema (for exajpple)
should be taken as a sign that he has made up his mind or
that he gave something like an order to himself, but it
shouldn't be taken as a prediction.
Our second thesis is that the agent's knowledge of
his reasons, i.e. his beliefs and desires, is non-inferential
too. Fhilosophers who disagree with our thesis, like Pears,
suggest that the dgree of feeling concomitant with a part¬
icular desire aan be evidence for its existence(in "Desires
as Causes of Actions", in Questions in the Philosophy of
Mind, Duckworth, 1975)* But this oannot be true either.
It is not clear at all how a person can know that this
particular degree of feeling is sufficient for his having
a desire. If such knowledge were possible it would be as
mysterious as non-inferential knowledge itself. Pears also
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assumes that a person can identify his degree of feeling
in a non-inferential way, but then it is not clear why
he cannot identify his desire in the same way. In general,
i-£ non-inferential knowledge were not possible, then an
alternative will either imply an infinite regress or a
possibility of giving grounds which are themselves unknowable.
A more powerful criticism of non-inferential knowledge
was given by Wittgenstein. To show such knowledge impossible
he gives the following arguments. He suggests that first-
person statements about inner experience are not propositions
at all. They are not used to assert something about the world
but are manifestations of its being so, they are extensions
of natural expressions. For example, * I am in pain' is like
moaning or crying. If so, then to say that I know I am in
pain cannot be a proposition either. It either means the
same as 'I have pain' or is senseless. 'It can't be said
of me at all (except perhaps as a .joke) that I know I am in
pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I
am in pain' (Fhiloso; hical Investigations, 246). Wittgenstein
seems to suggest that not only first-person statements about
one's sens .tions, but also statements about one's intentions,
desires, itc., should be assimilated to natural expressions.
He says 'What is the natural expression of an intention? -
Lobk at a oat when it stalks a bird, or a beast when it wants
to escape' (P.I.. 647). He also writes:
Am I to say that any one who has an intention has an
experience of tending towards something? That there
arc particular experiences of 'tending'? - Remember
this oase: if one urgently wants to make some remark,
some objection, in a discussion, it often happens that
one opens one's mouth, draws a breath and holds it;
if one then decides to let the objection go, one lets the
breath out. The experience of this process is evidently
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the experience of veering towards saying something.
Anyone who observes me will know that I wanted to
say something and then thought better of it.
(P.I.. 591)
T\it this expressive thesis is true neither in the case
of sensations nor in that of intentions and desires.
When I make statements about my experience in the past
or future tense, like 'I was in pain' or 'I had the
irfention' , they cannot be extensions of natural exp¬
ressions, so present-tense statements of this kind
can hardly be either. * I am in pain' can be used in
a molecular sentence like 'I am in pain, therefore I
must be ill', an 1 in this case it has a truth-value
so it cannot be a kind of natural expression. 1 can
also talk about my pain as being sharp or dull, and
if 'I am in pain' is not an assertion, how could such
descriptions be used? So criticism of non-inferential
knowledge cannot be based on the expressive thesis,
because the latter is wrong.
Wittgenstein also gives different reasons why
present-tense psychological statements in the first
person should be excluded from the domain of cognitive
statements. He suggests that they ha_yen't truth-\adues
because we haven't any crit_eria for determining such
truth-values. So they cannot be an object of possible
knowledge, because knowledge requires possession of a
true description of a state of affairs which is independ¬
ent of what it describes. Although this argument sounds
quite persuasive it cannot be right either. Sometimes
1 can say 'I intend to go to the concert' and mean it
to be a lie, so then I know that it is false. Hut if
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it can be false, it can also be true. If the thesis
that first-person statements about experience do not
have truth-values were right, such a lie wouldn't be
possible. So the non-cognitive thesis cannot rest
on this ground.
Sometimes Wittgenstein suggests that knowledge
is possible only where doubt makes sense. But it is
senseless to doubt such dtatements as 'I am in pain'
or 'I want to buy a book', so they should be excluded
from the domain of knowledge. The premise of this arg¬
ument is right, for there isn't room for doubt in the
above cases, but the conclusion doesn't follow.
It is equally senseless to doubt that I exist, or that
2+2=4, but it is still possible to talk about knowledge.
So Wittgenstein has not shown that non-inferential know-
lege is impossible.
Such knowledge is possible beoause terms like 'pain' ,
'intention', 'desire' belong to a publio language. I
learn to apply them to other people on the basis of their
bahscviour, and I also learn that other people ascribe them
to me on the basis of my behaviour. And when I become a
master of the language, 1 ascribe them to myself. Hacker,
in his book Insight and Illusion (O.U.P., 1972), writes:
* I am in pain' has, after all, a structure. As such
it is complex or articulated. My use of this sentence
is only intelligible in so far as 1 know what 'pain'
means, i.e. know how to apply the predicate on the
basis of those criteria which constitute its meaning.
Por this, as we have seen, is a precondition for my
ascribing it to myself without criteria. / 0^\
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The explanation of actions cannot he causal explanation
for another reason. The description of a cause cannot stip¬
ulate that its alleged effect should actually occur, but when
we cite the reasons for an action we presuppose that the action
will occufc. This argument, called by some philosophers "the
logical connection argument", seems to be the core in the
dispute between philosophers who are convinced that explan¬
ation in terms of reasons is not causal explanation and their
opponents. Despite the frequency with which it has been used
it remains pretty obscure. It is not clear what kind of log¬
ical or conceptual connection there is between actions and
reasons. Melden writes, in his book Free Action (Routledge
1961), p.141:
It is logically impossible that one should want but never
do, or that one should never do what one wants to do.
For where there is wanting there is an agent who does;
where there is doing there is an agent who can be and
has been attentive to what he is doing and who acts as
he does for a reason; where there is doing for a reason
there it is false that one does what one does not want
to do.
Melden seems to suggest here that desires or intentions
oannot exist without actions because without aotions it
wouldn't be possible to ascribe such states of mind to human
beings. We cannot imagine such a world in which human beings
have desires, motives, 6tc., but never act on them. Nevertheless
it is true that on a given occasion a person may want some¬
thing yet do nothing in order to get it. We can make an
anaology with orders here. As Wittgenstein rightly pointed
out, although on some occasions it is possible to disobey an
order, in general the very notion of an order presupposes that
it should be obeyed. And similarly the notion of a reason
for action presupposes that of action. This general formul-
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ation of the argument sheds some light on the nature of the
connection between reasons and actions. But in order to make
it clear we have to concentrate on a particular case.
Suppose a person wants to go for a walk, and his desire
is followed by tha action, i.e. going for a walk. The agents
desire is dscribed in such a way that it mentiort the action
which it is supposed to cago^e. Prom this fact, some philos¬
ophers believe, it follows that the desire cannot be the
cause of the action. But their conclusion doesn't seem to
be .justifiable. Firstly, in a lot of oases it is perfectly
possible to describe a desire in such a way that it doesn't
mention the action by which it is followed. Suppose a person
wants a book, and his desire is followed by his going to a
library. In this case the description of the desire doesn't
mention the action. So if we accept the above criterion it
will follow only that some desires are not causes of actions,
namely, those which ment ion an action in their description.
But for other desires which do not thus mention actions it
is possible for them to be the causes of actions. Secondly,
this criterion is too wide. It will exclude some genuinely
causal connections, like that between exposure to sun and
sutourn.
Suppose we give a stronger criterion, namely that a
desire cannot be regarded as the cause of an action if the
only way to specify it is by mentioning the action, directly
or indirectly. But this criterion doesn't seem to be good
enough either. It is still possible to dlind some causal
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statements which violate it. We are told by psychologists
that fear of stammeringcauses some people to stammer. In
this case the only way to specify the cause is by mentioning
its effect, but this fact still doesn't stop us regarding
it a s a cause.
In order to prove that desires are not causes of actions
we need a better criterion. We can formulate it as follows.
A desire cannot be a cause when an specification of the cause
stipulates that its supposed effect should actually occur.
Then the statement will be analytically true, so it cannot
be a causal statement. To understand this criterion better
let us give an example. Suppose a person wants to visit his
friend on 1-3-79 in the afternoon, that he doesn't change
his mind, and that nothing happens to prevent him making the
visit. Then it is logically impossible for him not to visit
his friend. If he didn't do it we will deny that he really
wanted to. It is true in virtue of how the concept of desire
is used in our language. Does this connection exclude a
causal connection? Pears suggests that sometimes a cause
can" be specified in such a way that it stipulates that its
effect will occur. In his paper "Desires as the Causes of
Actions" (loc. cit.) he gives such an example: 'A person's
death was caused by a fatal dose of barbiturate' (p.88).
But this specification con be removed because there is another
specification, namely a particular dose, say forty grains,
which doesn't stipulate any more that the effect should act¬
ually occur. But when we remove the specification which
stipulates that a praotical desire should cause the relvant
action, we have no other line onto it. Here we have the crux
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of the logical connectionn argument. It says that the
criterion for the existence of a desire is the fact that
it actually brings about the relevant action, and this is
the only criterion. But if so, a desire cannot be the
cause of the action, since there should be a contingent
relation between cause and effect.
Suppose an opponent denies the premisses of our arg¬
ument and suggests that a desire cannot be an analytically
necessary condition for the relevant action, since there
are well-known caseB when people want to do something but
don't actually do it, or when people want something but
don't do anything to get it. This means that there must
be a causal explanation of the non-fulfilment of the agent's
desire. But we are not denying that; we agree that in a
lot of cases there are intefer ing factors which can prevent
the desire from being realieed. In these cases there will
be a causal explanation of the non-f\ilfilment. But if they
are absent it will be a pripri necessary that the desire
will be followed by the relevant action.
Pears gives a stronger objection against the logical
connection argument. He suggests that the operation of a
practical desire can be the subject of empirical confirmation
or disconfirmation. But this could not be possible if the
thesis that there is a logical connection between desire and
the relevant action were true. In order to prove that a
practioal desire can become the subject of empirical test
Pears tries to specify the conditions which whould be sat¬
isfied on any testing occasion. These conditions are psych-
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ological and physical. The first condition requires that
the agentfsdesire to do something, all things considered,
must not have vanished in the interim. The second requires
that the agent must be aware that he is able to perform the
action. The physical condition must guarantee that there
are no external obstacles to his performance of it. If all
these conditions are satisfied then the agent's sincere
statement that he will do something should, according to
Pears, entail his doing it. So far we have been considering
a very simple case, where the agent wanted to do A all things
considered, and this was his only desire. But very often
we have cases where the desire is compound. The agent wants
to do A in order to achieve B and G, for example, There are
also cases where a component desire is an aversion.
The agent does A in order to achieve B although he doesn't
want to bring about G. Because the testing situation is
more complicated here we have to specify some further cond¬
itions, namely that the component desires engaged on the
original occasion must no* have decreased in number or in
degree in the interim; the agent must know that the situation
at the time of the test possesses the same features as on
the original oaccasion; and no aversion must have developed
in the agent in the interim. It is clear that the list of
requirements to be met by any testing situation cannot be
completed; it will always be an open-ended disjunction. If
so, then we can always suggest that there is some further
factor which should be taken into account in the test, and
thus falsifiability is not possible. But Pears has a reply
to this point. He suggests that the above fact creates
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difficulties not only for confirmation or disconfirmation
of practical desires but also for singular causal statements
It is undeniable that many singular causal statements
about physical events, like the one about the billiard
balls, have general implicates which, at some degree of
specificity and involvement in the details of the part¬
icular case, become uncompletable.
("Rational Explanation of Actions and Psychological
Determinism", in Essays on Freedom of Action,
edited by T.Honderich, Routledge, 1973, P.115)
Pears is right in suggesting that the list of intefering
factors can be uncompletable in both cases. But he i® wrong
in assuming that this fact oreates the same problem for test
ing the operation of a desire and the operation of a cause.
Suppose we make a hypothesis about some physical event,
say that this match will light when scratched, but that
when we scratch it, it doesn't light. We try to find a
factor or factors which prevented it from lighting. These
could be an absence of oxygen, or the mathh might have been
wet or badly made, or we didn't scratch it hard enough, etc.
This list of preventing f ctors could be open-ended, but thi
doesn't stop us from believing that if the conditions were
right the match would have lighted. We believe this on the
basis of the causal law which says that scratched matches
will light if the right conditions are satisfied. Suppose
we make a similar hypothesis about a future action, say
that the agent will go to a liijary this afternoon because
he says he wants to, but he doesn't actually go. We try
to find what prevented him feom going - he might have for¬
gotten about his desire, he could have changed his mind,
perhaps somebody told him that the library is closed, etc..
Maybe we cannot find which factor prevented him from going.
Suppose we ask him why he didn't go, but he is not able
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to give us a satisfactory account, yet still claims that
he wanted to go. In this case we will deny that he really
wanted to. But we cannot deny that the match was scratched.
The difference between the two cases lies in the fact that
in the first we were able to specify the cause and the
effect independently of each other. And although the
effect didn't happen and we were not able to explain why,
we still don't deny the operation of the cause, i.e. the
scratching of the match. But in the second case, the effect
was the criterion for the existence of the desire, so when
the action didn't happen we denied the existence of the
desire. This exa mple show that the connection between a
desire and the relevant action cannot be contingent, and
if so it cannot the subject to empirical test. So hears
is trying to do the logioally impossible, namely to subject
statements which are true in virtue of their meaning to
empirical test.
Pears also adopted another policy to prove that the
logical connection argument is wrong. He tries to show that
an action is not the only criterion for the existence of the
relevant desire. Firstly, he proposes the degree of feeling
concomitant with a desire as a criterion for its existence.
But we have already showed, in our analysis of non-inferential
knowledge of one's own desires, intentions, etc., that such
identification is not possible. Secondly, Pears suggests that
a brain state could be an independent criterion for the exist¬
ence of a desire. To prove this he cannot appeal to the type-
identity thesis, because it doesn't hold; the only thing he
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cam do is appeal to the token-identity thesis, i.e. to
Davidson's anomalous monism. But it is not certain that
this thesis is true either. Some philosophers, such as
McGinn, suggest that the arguments given against the type-
identity thesis are not valid against the token-identity
view. He writes:
I agree that this point is powerful against the type-
type theorist who accepts Kripke's conditions on an
adequate reply to the Cartesian. But I want to insist,
against Kripke, that hie favoured style of
explanation of the impression of contingency is available
to the token-token theorist.
("Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions",
Analysis Vol.37, 1976-7» P«79)
To recall, ICripke argues that if types of mental state are
identical with corresponding types of physical state they
should be necessarily identical, since this is an identity
between rigid designators. But we can imagine that they can
come apart, which is inconsistent with their being necessarily
identical. Why is McGinn convinced that a similar argument
cannot be given against the token-ideistity thesis? Let 'A' be
the name of a mental token, e.g. Jones' feeling pain at noon
on 1-10-78, and let *B' be the name of a physical token, e.g.
Jones' brain state at noon on 1-10-78. Kripke is convinced
'that it is at least logically possible that 3 should have
eiisted (Jones' brain could have been in exactly that state
at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at
all, and thus without the presence of A' (Naming and Necessity"
p.335)» We can also imagine, he claims, the converse situation,
i.e. Jones' feeling pain then without the corresponding brain
state. But this possibility that A and 3 oan come apart is
inconsistent with their being necessarily identical. McGinn
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argues that Kripke is wrong in suggesting that A and B can
come apart. If they are necessarily identical it is logic¬
ally impossible that they can come apart. To understand
MoGinn's point better let us give an example which is taken
from Kripke's own paper "Identity and Necessity", although
he doesn't seem to be aware of the possible analogy between
it and the token-identity of mental states with brain states.
Suppose there is a table in front of me which is made of wood.
According to some philosophers, in another possible world
this very table could have been made of ice, but Kripke argues
that they are wrong. It is an essential property of this
table that it is made of wood, so in any other possible world
it has to be made of wood too. When we are wondering whether
"it" could have been made of ioe, we, according to Kripke,
A
talking about a different table. McGinn writes:
In this respect, token mental states are like particular
tables, they can be (and be essentially) of a type such
that other tokens of that type fail to have properties
which they, qualbkens, necejjarily have. (j0<3 p go)
So Kripke's claim that A and B can come apart is not justified,
if KoGinn is right. But to resolve this problem one way or
the other we need an account of the notions ofessential prop¬
erty and of identity across possible worlds (these are equiv¬
alent notions). But neither Kripke nor McGinn give a satis¬
factory account of them, so our problem will have to be
resolved on different grounds.
First of all, we will have to make clear what is the
nature of the identification of particular mental states with
corresponding brain states. Is it an empirical identification,
like that of temperature with mean kinetic energy of molecules?
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The answer must be no, because temperature and mesn kinetic
energy can be measured empirically and established indepdnntly
of eacho other. Whereas mental predicates do not denote nat¬
ural kinds, so they cannot be specified empirically. Witt¬
genstein said:
Misleading parallel: psychology treats of processes in
the mental sfchere, as does physics in the physical.
Seeing , hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not
the subject of psychology in the same sense as that in
which movmemaBts of bodies, the phenomena of electricity,
etc. are the subject of physics. You can see this from
the fact that the physicist see, hears, thinks,
about, and informs us of these phenomena, and the psych¬
ologist observes the external r< actions (the behaviour)
of the subject, (philosophical Investigations, 571)
If we cannot observe or measure mental states what is our
justification for saying that they are identical with brain
states? To justify this the adherents of identity theories
give us a metaphysical thesis which says that every mental
state is identical with a corresponding brain state, and
suggest that it can be justified on purely philosophical
grounds. But philosophical arguments can also be given in
favour of other theories, like double-aspect or parrallelist
views, which don't identify mental states with physical states.
Suppose the advocates of identity theories argue that the
identification can be established indirectly, on the basis
of behaviour. But if so, then we cannot remove behaviour
from the specification of desires, and hears' attempt to
show that the logical connection between desire and action
can be removed by using a brain state as an independent crit¬
erion for the existence of a practical desire must fail.
Pears might then a*gue that behaviour can be described and
explained in purely physical terms, i.e. in terms of mere
bodily movements. L1ut we cannot do that without changing
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the subject; our description and explanation would no
longer be an explanation and description of intentional
action. In the previous chapter we argued in detail why
the psychological description of intention action cannot
be reduced to physical description. So the token-idMfcLty
thesis cannot serve Fears* purpose, firstly, because it
cannot help him remove the logical connection between desire
and action, and secondly, because the theory itself is not
well-established.
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Chapter IV - PRACTICAL REASONINC AS INTERPRETIVE
SCHEME FOR ACTION
We have tried to show that various attempts to
assimilate explanation in teims of reasons to the explan¬
ation characteristic of the physical sciences lead to
failure. To explain human actions we use intentional
language, which in principle cannot be reduced to the
extensional language used in the natural sciences. We
also showed that explanation in terms of reasons doesn't
depend for its validity upon the truth of nomic connections
(causal laws), so the models we use to account for phys¬
ical phenomena cannot be applied to human behaviour. To
c
account for an aation we use pratical reasoning, i.e. a
A*
practical syllogism. The practical syllogism is regarded
by some contemporary philosophers, like Anscornbe, Von
Wright, Kenny and others, as the best way to explain int¬
entional actions. The conception of the practical syll¬
ogism was introduced for the first time by Aristotle and,
according to Anscombe, it was one of his best discoveries,
although she thinks that it "has been lost to modern phil¬
osophy through misinterpretation" (intention, p.58)« Von
Wright too is convinced that practical reasoning is of
great importance in the explanation and understanding of
act ion;
It is a tenet of the present work that the practical
syllogism provides the sciences of man with something
missing from their methodology: an explanation model
in its own right which is a definite alternative to
the subsumption-theoretic covering law model. Broadly
speaking, what the subsumption-theoretic covering law
model is to causal explanation and explanation in the
natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to telec-
logical explanation and explanation in history and the
social sciences. /,n , , . , TT , . .(Explanation and Understanding,
Routledge, 1, p.27)
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What is the nature of practical reasoning? We
can say, in general, that it is the kind of reasoning
involved in rational deliberation leading up to and
providing grounds for an action. In practical reasoning,
as in theoretical, we pass from premisses such as state¬
ments of the agent's intentions or desires, and statements
about the available means, to a conclusion about what he
will or must do, given these desires and circumstances.
According to Aristotle:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a
doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor
an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone
else dediberate about his end. They assume the end
and consider how and by what means it is to be attained;
and if it seems to be produced by several means they
consider by which it is most easily and best produced,
while if it is achieved by one only they consider how
it will be achieved by this and by what means this will
be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which
in the order of disoovery is last. ... And if we come
on an impossibility, we give up the searoh, e.g. if
we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing
appears possible we try to do it.
(Nicofaachean Ethics III, 1112bl8ff)
But what Aristotle said about ends doesn't seem to be
always true. In some cases a doctor may deliberate wheJsher
or not to heal a very senile patient with pneuomonia, for
example, although he has means available. Sometimes we
wonder whether our end i£ \40rth our energy and time, and
if we come to the conclusion that it isn't we give it up
rather than adopt the available means for its realization.
Very clear examples of deliberation about ends occur in
cases of insistent desires. Because we know we oannot
satisfy both, we deliberate about which one is more imp¬
ortant for us. Aristotle thought that a proposition con¬
stituting a universal premise expresses some general human
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value, as in the following, example:
Dry foad suits any human.
Such-and-such food is dry.
1 am human.
This is a bit of such-and-such food.
So, this food suits me.
Contemporary writers suggest that practical reasoning is
not ethical argument, so wQ, should not talk of goodness
but rather of desirability (Anscombe), satisfaction (Ross)
or satisfactoriness (Kenny) as the value to be transmitted
by practical reasoning. And these values are not something
which can be established objectively, but are relative to
the wants of a given individual, since what is desirable
or satisfactory for some people might not be so for others.
It can also happen that a person can recognise something
as desirable in general, like healthy food for example,
and yet not accept it as a reason for his action in a
particular situation} if he is very hungry, he may eat
food which is not healthy. Contemporary philosophers
also disagree with Aristotle's assumption that the major
premise can be expressed in a universal statement. They
suggest that a universal proposition cannot become a
starting point for reasoning about what to do in a part¬
icular case. To show this, Anscombe gives the following
example (borrowed from Hare):
Do everything conducive to not having a car crash.
Such-and-such is conducive to not having a car crash.
Ergo, do such-and-such.
Anscombe says this premise is insane, since "there are
usually a hundred different and incompatible things con¬
ducive to not having a car crash: such as, perhaps, driv¬
ing into the private gateway on your left and abandoning
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your oar there, and driving into the private gateway
on your right and abandoning the car there" (Intention,
p.59). The suggestion that the major premise should
be a singular statment seems plausible, because when it
is expressed by a universal proposition it laoks the
precision indispensable for reaching a conclusion about
what is to be done, given the agent's end and the
circumstances.
The minor premise of a practical syllogism is a
statement about the means which have to be adopted if
the end is to be realized. Kant thought that the princ¬
iple of transformation of intention from ends to means
is analytically true. He said "Who wills the end, wills
(so far as reason has decisive influence on his action)
also, the means which are indispensably necessary and in
his power" (The I "oral Law, p.84-5)• The choice of means
is determined by the agent's perception of the circum¬
stances in which he is going to perform his action.
In some cases he may come to the conclusion that there
is only one means available for him. For example, if
he wants a book, and the only way to get it is to borrow
it from the library. But more often he has to choose
between incompatible means. Suppose he wants to talk to
his friend who lives in London. He can either telephone
his friend, or visit him in London, or ask his friend to
visit him. In cases like this, the agent may have no
sufficient reason for choosing one course of action rather
than another. Some philosophers suggest that the rational
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agent will always choose what is the best, or what
seems to him to be the best. But it is possible to
argue that, as in our example, the means available to
him are equally good, so he is justified in choosing
any of them. We also observe that in real life people
very often choose means which are not necessarily the
best for the realization of their ends. From this it
follows that given the agent's end and the circumstances,
he may have no sufficient reason for choosing one course
of action rather than another. So reasons do not always
necessitate the agent's action.
It is not very clear what is the nature of the conc¬
lusion of a praotical syllogism. According to Aristotle,
in pratical reasonings
the two premises result in a conclusion which is an
action - for example, one thinks that all men are to
march and that is a man oneself: straightway one
marches; or no men are to march now and that one is
a man: straight way one halts. And so one acts in
the two cases provided there is nothing to compel
or to prevent. Again., I should make a good thing,
a house is a good thing: Straightway 1 make a house.
1 need a covering, a cloak is a covering; I need a
cloak. What I need I should make, I need a cloak;
I should make a cloak. And the conclusion - 'I
should make a cloak' - is an action. And the action
goes back to the beginning or first step. If there
is to be a coat, one must first have B, and if B
then A, so one gets A to feegin with. That the action
is the conclusion is clear.
(De Motu Animalium, 701a7ff)
But Aristotle was wrong to think that the conclusion of
a piece of practical reasoning is an action. For, firstly,
something can prevent the perfonuance of the action, and
then it will not occur even if the premises were true.
Secondly, if the conclusion is an action, then the
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inference can only be drawn just before the time of the action,
and it is not very dear how it can be a conclusion about a
future action. Some philosophers, like Von Wright, suggest
that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is the agent's
declaration of an intention to perform the action. But this
view has some disadvantages too. It generates a difference
between the conclusion expressed in the first person by the
agent involved in reasoning about his action, and the conc¬
lusion expressed in the third person by an observer. In the
former, the argument issues in a declaration of an intention;
in the latter, it issues in a prediction about what the agent
will do. Because of these difficulties, some philosophers
suggest that the conclusion should be a deontic statement
which says that the agent ought to perform a certain action.
Kenny, who holds this view, says "the correct account seems
to be that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning
is a description of an action to be done: a fiat concerning
the reasoner's action" (Will, Freedom and Power, Blackwell,
197S, p.98). But this view generates different problems.
The premises of a practical argument are descriptive, they
assert what is the case; but the conclusion is supposed to
be normative or prescriptive. And as Hume pointed out, one
cannot draw a normative conclusion from factual premises.
But perhaps this difficulty is only apparent, being generated
by the word 'conclusion' which has been used in this context.
Maybe the right word here is "decision' or 'outcome'. Talk
of conclusions assimilates practical reasoning too closely
to theoretical reasoning.
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Practical inference is entirely different from
theoretical inference, i.e. a practical syllogism is
not a proof syllogism. Anscornbe suggests that Aristotle
himself is partly responsible for this misunderstanding
of the nature of the practical syllogism, because
although it was perfectly clear to him that he had
found a completely different form of reasoning from
theoretical reasoning or proof syllogism, it pleased
him to give cases of it whioh made it as parallel as
possible to the theoretical syllogism" (intention, p.59)»
The practical syllogism is not a demonstration, its
purpose is not to prove that sornething-or-other is the
case; but to show that so-and-so is to be done. The
outcome 0f practical inference does a job which is
similar in many respects to that done by explicit commands.
But if so, it cannot be true or false, it is not a prop¬
osition. That is why if the state of affairs described
by the outcome does not, in fact, obtain, we do not
call the outcome false but we rather fault the state
of affairs. To show this, Anscombe gives the following
example. A man is going roand a town with a shopping
list in his hand. Suppose he made the list himself and
it is an expression of his intention. If the list and
the things the man actually buys do not agree, then, says
Anscombe, "the mistake is not in the list but in the man's
performance" (intention, p.56) - (we have to assume, of
course, that the man didn't change his mind in the interim).
Now let us suppose that the man is followed by a detective
who makes a list of the things he buys. In this case,
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if "there is a discrepancy between the detective's list
and what the man actually buys, we will say that there
is a mistake in the record, but not in the man's perf¬
ormance. For in this case the facts are prior, and
dictate what is to be said, whereas in the former case
the discrepancy doesn't impute a fault to the language
but to the event, because here language functions as
an order.
There is another important difference between
practical and theoretical reasoning. In the latter
the rules of inference ensure that we never pass from
true assertions to false ones. If the premises are true
and the argument is valic^ the conclusion must be true.
And a proposition which has the value 'true' cannot at
the same time have the opposite value 'false*. But the
rules of inference in practical reasoning cannot be truth-
preserving because, as we already pointed out, the out¬
come of a practical syllogism is not a proposition but
a fiat, which is neither true nor false. According to
Kenny, the rules of inference in practical reasoning
are satisfuctoriness-preserving. He says:
In practical reasoning we never pass from a fiat
which is satisfactory for a given purpose to a fiat
which is unsatisfactory for that purpose. These
rules are satisfactoriness-preserving, just as rules
for assertoric inference are truth-preserving.
(Willt Freedom and Power, p.81)
But Kenny's suggestion cannot be right, for the following
reasons. In practical reasoning the premises can have
incompatible values, as in conflict situations when one
has a good reason for doing one thing and at the same
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time a different reason for not doing that very thing,
but something inconsistent with it. For example, some¬
one wants to write his essay, but his mother is very
tired and needs his help, so he would like to help her,
but it is not possible for him to do both things. Some
philosophers suggest that in such cases one reason has
to override the other if the agent is to act at all, so
that we can distinguish between the stronger and weaker
reasons. And the reason which was overridden can be
regarded as not existing at all. But this is not a
correct interpretation of the conflict situation. It
denies that fact of human experience, that there are
real conflicts of reasons. ;inytday, for one reason to
override another, the other has to exist, otherwise
there is nothing to override. The conflicting reasons
actually continue to exist even when one overrides
another. And although one cannot do both actions, the
reasons both apply to one's situation. But if so, then
the outcome of a practical syllogism can have incom¬
patible values, satisfaction and non-satisfaction at the
same time. This means that the rules governing practical
reasoning cannot be satisfactoriness-preserving. There
is nothing preserved in practical reasoning|^the way^truth
is preserved in theoretical reasoning.
Practical reasoning, as opposed to theoretical,
doesn't necessitate its outcome. The same premises
in a practical syllogism can le ,d to incompatible
decisions, since the agent might not have sufficient
reasons for choosing one means to his end rather than
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another, if they are equally good for his purposes. Suppose
1 want to read Plato's Republic but I haven't a copy of it.
I can either buy one in a boolcshop, borrow one from a library,
or ask my friend who has a copy to lend it to me. Some phil¬
osophers suggest that if practical reasoning can lead to incom¬
patible outcomes then whatever course of action the agent
finally chooses, his action will be inexplicable by his reasons.
But to suggest this is to deny the agent's freedom of choice
between different, but equally good, means. This very freedom
must lead to a loosening of the links between premises and
outcome in the practical syllogism. And it doesn't matter
what course of action the agent chooses, given that he had
reasons for performing it, his reasons will still explain his
action. But they will not explian his choice of means, for
by hypothesis he had no reason for preferring any one of the
alternative means available. Reasons can explain some aspects
of action, but not all.
Some philosophers suggest that in a situation where the
agent has only one available means to his end, reasons necess¬
itate the action. But this is true only in some cases. In
others, the agent might feel an aversion against those means,
and would give up his end rather than adopt the means necess¬
ary for its realization. From this it follows that in a lot
of cases the agent's reasons, given the circumstances, only
incline him to perform a certain action, but don't necessitate
it.
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There is another kind of defeasibility involved
in practical reasoning. In some cases the decision
may not be acted upon at all, even if the agent didn't
change his mind, and nothing prevented him from acting.
In such cases, we either deny the existence of the
supposed desires or intentions, i.e. the agent's reasons
for acting, or we ascribe weakness of will to him.
When an action is very easy to perform, but the agent
didn't do it despite a declaration of his intention,
we are more likely to deny that he really had that
intention than to ascribe weakness of will to him.
Suppose the agent said that he wanted to watch a cert -
ain programme on television, and although nothing
prevented him farom doing that, and he didn't seern to
change his mind, he actually didn't watch the programme.
In this case we would probably say that he didn't really
want to see the programme, we are more likely to ascribe
weakness of will when we think that the action is very
difficult to perfdrm or demands a great effort, as in
the following example. The agent said that he wanted
to write a paper on the nature of time, but despite this
declaration he didn't write anything. In this case we
are likely to believe that his failure was the result of
weakness of will. However, the distinction between these
two types of oase is not very clear, and it is possible
to have different intuitions about them.
62
At the beginning of the last chapter we quoted
Von Wright as saying that the practical syllogism
provides the social sciences with a model of explan¬
ation which can be a def inite alternative to the
nomological-deductive model of explanation oharacter-
istic of the natural sciences. A methodological
monist may suggest that what we really presented
can hardly be called a model of explanation. It
provides us neither with a generalization nor with
a systematic prediction, since practical reasoning
is defeasible. Indeed, a practical syllogism is not
a model of explanation. It is an interpretive scheme,
a conceptual framework which we apply to understand
an intentional action. And it is the only thing which
philosophers interested in explaining human behaviour
can do. As Aristotle himself said;
The theory of practice oan only be schematic.
Matters concerned with conduct and questions of w
what is good for us have no more rigidity than
matters of health. The general account (of pract¬
ical knowledge) being of this nature, the account
of particular cases is yet more lacking in exact¬
ness; for they do not fall under epiy technical rule
or prescription, but agents themselves in each
case consider what is appropriate to the occasion
to do, as happens in the ' " J ation.
Practical reasoning concerns what is ultimate and
particular and constantly changing. The agent's means-
deliberation system is not a closed, complete or even
consistent system. It is a constant reassessment of
features of a situation, and a permanent modification
of the agent's own projects, interest, emotions, etc..
To attempt to subsume such a process under some
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general law is to try to close and complete something
which cannot be completed or closed in principle.
There is no real chance of inventing a scientific
theory which can explain intentinnal action. Neither
is there a possibility of finding some "logic" of the
process of means-end deliberation. As we said before,
to adopt practical principles is to be motivated to
act in a certain way. But it is not true that these
principles logically imply certain imperatives. The
relation between ends, means and action is different
from a logic of imperatives, or any other logic.
The suggestion that practical principles are governed
by some such logic or can be subsumed under some
general law (even if we don't know it) is a normative
requirement rather than a rewilt of investigation.
And, as Wittgenstein put its
The requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.
- We have got on to slippery ice where there is no
friction and so in a certain sense the conditions
are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are
unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need frict¬
ion. Back to the rough ground.
(Philo sot hical Investipations, 107)
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